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Health Law 
Physician Aid in Dying and Assessment of Patient Capacity 
 




In 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court held that states may 
constitutionally prohibit physicians from providing a lethal 
prescription to terminally ill patients who request aid in dying.2 
Yet despite their authority to retain the prohibition, nine states 
(California, Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, Montana, New Jersey, 
Oregon, Washington, Vermont) and the District of Columbia 
permit “physician aid in dying” (“PAD”).3  
Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act,4 the paradigm PAD statute, 
allows a patient diagnosed with a “terminal” (that is, “incurable 
and irreversible”) disease, whose life expectancy does not exceed 
six months, to request a lethal prescription for self-administration 
“for the purpose of ending his or her life in a humane and dignified 
manner.”5 The statute includes a panoply of procedural and 
substantive safeguards, seeking to enhance and support patients’ 
end-of-life choices while protecting them from coercion and 
unwise personal decisions. All other U.S. jurisdictions permitting 
PAD have closely followed the Oregon model. 
One of the most important protections for patients seeking 
PAD is the requirement of informed consent. This requirement 
seeks to ensure that patients consenting to PAD are fully informed 
of their choices, act voluntarily, and are legally competent to 
choose. It explicitly prohibits PAD for persons whose 
decisionmaking is impaired due to depression or other mental 
disorders. This Chapter reviews and interprets PAD provisions 
 
1 Excerpted and adapted from Lois A. Weithorn, Psychological Distress, 
Mental Disorder, and Assessment of Decisionmaking Capacity Under 
U.S. Medical Aid in Dying Statutes, 71 HASTINGS L.J. 637 (2020).  
2 Glucksberg v. Washington, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Vacco v. Quill, 521 
U.S. 793 (1997). 
3 Weithorn, supra note 1, at 644–46. 
4 OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800–.897. 
5 Id. §§ 127.800(12), 127.805. 
2021 Scholarship for the Bench 78 
addressing patient competence within the context of applicable 
legal doctrine and scientific findings.  
 
Patient Decisionmaking Competence Under PAD Statutes 
 
The doctrine of informed consent establishes individuals’ 
legal authority to make decisions about their own healthcare. 
Underlying and animating the doctrine is respect for autonomy,6 
which highlights the values of personal choice and “self-rule that 
is free from both controlling interferences by others 
and . . . limitations such as inadequate understanding that prevents 
meaningful choice.”7 In order to achieve its promise, the doctrine 
requires that consent be informed (rendered only after 
communication by the healthcare provider of legally required 
elements of disclosure),8 that decisions be made voluntarily (free 
from coercive or controlling influences)9 and that patients make 
the decisions competently (with the capacity to understand and 
reason about the information provided).10  
Four standards of competence prevail in American law, the 
most common one of which is understanding of the information 
communicated by the practitioner.11 The other three standards that 
appear in statutes or case law focus on patients’ ability to 
communicate a choice among the treatment options; ability to 
reason about the treatment information provided; and ability to 
 
6 Tom L. Beauchamp, Autonomy and Consent, in THE ETHICS OF 
CONSENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 55, 58–61 (Franklin G. Miller & Alan 
Wertheimer eds. 2010). 
7 TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF 
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 101 (7th ed. 2012). 
8 AM. MED. ASS’N CODE OF MED. ETHICS 2.1.1. 
9 See Paul S. Appelbaum, Charles W. Lidz & Robert Klitzman, 
Voluntariness of Consent to Research: A Conceptual Model, 39 
HASTINGS CTR. RPT. 30, 32 (2009); Robert M. Nelson, Tom Beauchamp, 
Victoria A. Miller, William Reynolds, Richard F. Ittenbach & Mary 
Frances Luce, The Concept of Voluntary Consent, 11 AM. J. BIOETHICS 
6 (2011). 
10 See THOMAS GRISSO & PAUL S. APPELBAUM, ASSESSING 
COMPETENCE TO CONSENT TO TREATMENT: A GUIDE FOR PHYSICIANS 
AND OTHER HEALTH PROFESSIONALS 31–60 (1998).  
11 See Paul S. Appelbaum, Assessment of Patients’ Competence to 
Consent to Treatment, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1834, 1836 tbl.1 (2007). 
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appreciate the likely consequences and implications of the 
treatment options as applied to the patient’s own condition and 
situation. 
All PAD statutes require, with fairly consistent criteria, that 
practitioners certify that the patient is capable of making 
healthcare decisions. Oregon defines decisionmaking capacity as: 
“the ability to make and communicate health care decisions to 
health care providers.”12 Oregon further specifies that an 
“informed decision” is  
 
based on appreciation of the relevant facts and after being fully 
informed by the attending physician of: (a) His or her medical 
diagnosis; (b) His or her prognosis; (c) The potential risks 
associated with taking the medication as prescribed; (d) The 
probable result of taking the medication to be prescribed; and 
(e) The feasible alternatives, including, but not limited to, 
comfort care, hospice care, and pain control.13  
 
If conditions indicate that the patient may not have decisional 
capacity, but the patient still seeks PAD, the physician must refer 
the patient to a mental health professional for further assessment 
of capacity, with no life-ending drugs provided until that 
consultant “determines that the patient is not suffering from a 
psychiatric or psychological disorder or depression causing 
impaired judgment.”14 This formulation defines a two-pronged 
test: (1) whether the patient is experiencing a disorder or 
depression; and (2) whether any such observed disorder or 
depression is causing impaired judgment. None of the statutes 
makes the presence of a mental disorder dispositive of incapacity; 
the disorder or condition also must cause impaired judgment. 
“Impaired judgment,” as defined in the Vermont statute, exists 
 
12 OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 § 1.01(3). Other PAD jurisdictions have 
similar definitions. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-48–102(10); D.C. 
CODE § 7-661.01(2); ME. STAT. § 22-2140(2)(C); N.J. STAT. § 26:16-3; 
VT. STAT. § 18-5281(2); WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245.010(3). 
13 OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800(7) (emphasis added). Other PAD 
jurisdictions have similar provisions. E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY 
CODE § 443.1. 
14 OR. REV. STAT. § 127.825. Cf. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY 
CODE §§ 443.1–443.5 (providing similarly). 
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when “a person does not sufficiently understand or appreciate the 
relevant facts necessary to make an informed decision.”15 
 
The Legal Presumption of Competence 
 
Under modern legal standards, adults are presumed competent 
to make treatment decisions, irrespective of a diagnosis of a 
mental or physical disorder, and despite the concern that persons 
dying from a terminal disease may be prone to depression or other 
mental disorders likely to affect their decisional capacity.  
In the United States, modern law recognizes “a rebuttable 
presumption affecting the burden of proof that all persons have 
the capacity to make decisions and to be responsible for their acts 
or decisions.”16 This presumption for all persons applies to those 
with mental disorders, mental disabilities, or cognitive 
impairments.17 
The presumption can be overcome not by resort to diagnoses 
or labels, but only by a direct criterion-relevant assessment of the 
person’s functional abilities.18 Decades of research on the 
assessment of treatment-decisionmaking competence have led to 
a number of empirically developed assessment guidelines and 
tools, such as those developed by the MacArthur Treatment 
Competence Study team.19  
The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study, the seminal 
study in the field, compared the decisionmaking competence of 
three groups of recently hospitalized patients, using measures that 
operationalized the standards of competence defined above. The 
 
15 VT. STAT. § 18-5281(5). Cf. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.1(i) 
(implying a similar definition). 
16 THOMAS GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES 392 (2d ed. 2003).  
17 GRISSO & APPELBAUM, supra note 10, at 18–19. Cf. CAL. WELF. & 
INST. CODE § 5331 (“No person may be presumed to be incompetent 
because he or she has been evaluated or treated for mental disorder or 
chronic alcoholism, regardless of whether such evaluation or treatment 
was voluntarily or involuntarily received.”). 
18 SCOTT Y. KIM, EVALUATION OF CAPACITY TO CONSENT TO 
TREATMENT AND RESEARCH 11 (2010). 
19 THOMAS GRISSO & PAUL S. APPELBAUM, MACARTHUR COMPETENCE 
ASSESSMENT TOOL FOR TREATMENT (MACCAT-T) (1998); PAUL S. 
APPELBAUM & THOMAS GRISSO, MACCAT-T: THE MACARTHUR 
COMPETENCE ASSESSMENT TOOL FOR CLINICAL RESEARCH (2001). 
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patients in the three groups of were diagnosed with schizophrenia 
or schizoaffective disorder, major depression, and ischemic heart 
disease.20 These patients were compared with a group of healthy 
persons from the community. Impairments in performance were 
“more pronounced and more consistent across measures for the 
schizophrenia patients,” with approximately 25% of the 
schizophrenic group scoring in the “impaired” range on each 
measure of capacity compared to 5–7% of the heart disease 
patients and 2% of the community group. Notably, approximately 
50% of the patients with schizophrenia and 75% of the patients 
with depression revealed adequate performance across all 
competence measures. Adequate performance increased to 75% 
and 90% in those two groups, respectively, on the most commonly 
used legal standard of competence—understanding.21 Subsequent 
studies by other researchers report strikingly consistent results. 
The scientific literature reveals that, while chronic psychotic 
disorders present a risk of incompetence, “there is tremendous 
heterogeneity in that group,” with many such patients performing 
quite well on competence measures initially, and others improving 
performance with supportive interventions to promote 
competence.22 Mild and moderately depressed individuals 
generally meet competence standards, as do most severely 
depressed persons. These findings underscore the importance of 
individualized assessments of patients whose competence is 
uncertain, examining those capacities implicated by the legal 
standards. 
 
Characteristics and Psychological Functioning of  
Patients Seeking PAD 
 
The website of the Health Authority of the State of Oregon 
offers the most substantial body of data about the persons who 
seek PAD in the United States.23 Data from the other jurisdictions 
 
20 Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Appelbaum, The MacArthur Treatment 
Competence Study III: Abilities of Patients to Consent to Psychiatric and 
Medical Treatments, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 149, 150 (1995). 
21 Id. at 169. 
22 KIM, supra note 18, at 45–50. 
23 OREGON HEALTH AUTHORITY, OREGON DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT: 
2018 DATA SUMMARY 4 (2019). 
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authorizing PAD are consistent with those reported by Oregon. 
The cumulative 20-year Oregon data reveal that most patients who 
have used PAD are age 65 and older (73%) with a median age of 
72 years, are White (96%), and have had at least some college 
education (73%).24 Most (90%) were enrolled in hospice, and 
almost all (99%) were covered by either private or public 
insurance. The most common qualifying medical conditions 
included cancer (76%), neurological diseases such as amyotrophic 
lateral sclerosis (11%), cardiac disease (9%); and respiratory 
disease (8%). Patient reasons for seeking PAD were primarily 
psychological and psychosocial: loss of autonomy (95%), 
lessened ability to engage in life activities (95%), and loss of 
dignity (79%). Other concerns included loss of control of bodily 
functions (56%), possible burdens on family, friends, and 
caregivers (52%), worries about inadequate pain control (30%) 
and financial implications of treatment (5%). Oregon reports that 
5% of the patients who ultimately died from PAD had been 
referred for mental health evaluation and found competent by the 
consulting mental health professional. Oregon does not report data 
on patients who requested PAD but were found not to be 
competent after a mental health referral.  
According to the scientific literature, persons in the later 
stages of terminal disease experience emotional suffering to a 
greater extent than do persons in the general population.25 It is 
unclear, however, whether those with such serious diseases 
experience a higher prevalence of mental disorder. Reported 
prevalence of diagnosable mental disorders varies.26 Investigators 
 
24 Id. at 8 tbl.1. 
25 See, e.g., Harvey Max Chochinov, Psychiatry and Terminal Illness, 45 
CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 413, 146–48 (2000); Katherine LeMay & Keith 
Wilson, Treatment of Existential Distress in Life Threatening Illness: A 
Review of Manualized Interventions, 28 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 472, 
472 (2008); Wendy G. Lichtenthal, Matthew Nilsson, Baohui Zhang, 
Elizabeth D. Trice, David W. Kissane, William Breitbart & Holly G. 
Prigerson, Do Rates of Mental Disorders and Existential Distress Among 
Advanced Stage Cancer Patients Increase as Death Approaches? 18 
PSYCHO-ONCOLOGY 50, 54 (2009). 
26 See, e.g., Robert L. Fine, Depression, Anxiety, and Delirium in the 
Terminally Ill Patient, 14 BAYLOR U. MED. CTR. PROC. 130, 130 (2001) 
(citing reports of incidence of major depression in terminally ill patients 
ranging from 25% to 77%). 
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report challenges of distinguishing between the presence of a 
mental disorder and the psychological distress attendant to the 
grief, loss, and suffering that often accompanies the dying 
process.27 According to some studies, a subset of patients who 
request and receive PAD appear to their physicians to be 
depressed or to meet certain clinical criteria of depression. 
“[P]hysicians may reason that it is normal to be depressed or may 
be unable to distinguish depression from sadness under 
circumstances of terminal illness.” Or physicians may believe 
“that depression was not interfering with decisional capacity and 
was not the primary reason for the request.”28 Clearly, criterion-
relevant assessments of decisionmaking capacity are necessary to 
ensure that depressive, or any other psychological, symptoms do 
not impair decisional competence, regardless of the source of 
those symptoms. 
 
Distinguishing Choosing PAD from a  
Desire to Commit Suicide 
 
 The term “physician assisted suicide,” used by some to refer 
to PAD, has been rejected by all PAD jurisdictions. Mental health 
experts define suicide as a form of self-destruction of a life that 
was not otherwise ending. Experts note that suicide is frequently 
a manifestation of psychopathology.29 By contrast, PAD assists 
patients in exerting some measure of control over the timing and 
manner of an already-impending death that will occur within six 
months due to a terminal illness. As one team of mental health 
professionals puts it: “[S]uicide is defined by the act of intentional 
 
27 Susan D. Block, Assessing and Managing Depression in the 
Terminally Ill Patient, 132 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 209, 209–10 
(2000); Eric W. Widera & Susan D. Block, Managing Grief and 
Depression at the End of Life, 86 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 259, 259 (2012). 
28 Diane E. Meier, Carol-Ann Emmons & Ann Litke, Characteristics of 
Patients Requesting and Receiving Physician-Assisted Death, 163 
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1537, 1538 (2003); Linda Ganzini, Elizabeth 
R. Goy & Stephen K. Dobscha, Prevalence of Depression and Anxiety 
in Patients Requesting Physicians’ Aid in Dying: Cross Sectional 
Survey, BMJ, Aug. 2018, at 1. 
29 See AM. ASS’N OF SUICIDOLOGY, STATEMENT OF THE AMERICAN 
ASSOCIATION OF SUICIDOLOGY: “SUICIDE” IS NOT THE SAME AS “PAD” 
(2017). 
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self-inflicted death, [whereas, when patients seek PAD,] the 
primary (although not proximal) cause of death is from a 
foreseeable underlying terminal illness.”30  
Distinguishing between a desire to die grounded in the 
psychopathology of depression and a desire to die grounded in 
physical, emotional, and spiritual suffering caused by the terminal 
illness and impending death can be difficult even for mental health 
professionals.31 The legally relevant question, however, is 
whether the patient’s treatment decisionmaking capacity is 
impaired. A careful criterion-relevant assessment of the 
decisionmaking capacity of those persons who are suspected of 
manifesting such impairment is needed to separate out those who 
do not meet the legal standards of competence set forth in the 
governing statutes. 
 
The Possibility of Neurocognitive Impairments in  
Patients Seeking PAD 
 
Although the PAD statutes direct attention to mental disorders 
and depression, persons who are medically eligible for PAD may 
be more likely to experience impairments in decisionmaking 
capacity due to neurocognitive limitations. Several factors explain 
why this population may be at greater risk than the general 
population for neurocognitive impairment. 
A recent study estimated the rate of dementia in persons ages 
71 and older to be 14%.32 The median age of persons receiving 
PAD in Oregon is 72. Persons over age 65 do not necessarily 
experience cognitive declines that affect treatment 
 
30 See Dan Nguyen & Joe Yager, PAD: Ethical and Practical Issues for 
Psychiatrists, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES (Dec. 20, 2018). See also John 
Michael Bostwick & Lewis M. Cohen, Differentiating Suicide from Life-
Ending Acts and End-of-Life Decisions: A Model Based on Chronic 
Kidney Disease and Dialysis, 50 PSYCHOSOMATICS 1 (2009). 
31 Elizabeth Goy, Linda Ganzini & Tony Farrenkopf, Mental Health 
Consultation, in THE OREGON DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT: A 
GUIDEBOOK FOR HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS (2008). 
32 B.L. Plassman, K.M. Langa, G.G. Fisher, S.G. Heeringa, D.R. Weir, 
M.B. Ofstedal, J.R. Burke, M.D. Hurd, G.G. Potter, W.L. Rodgers, D.C. 
Steffens, R.J. Willis & R.B. Wallace, Prevalence of Dementia in the 
United States: The Aging, Demographics, and Memory Study, 29 
NEUROEPIDEMIOLOGY 125, 125 (2007). 
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decisionmaking, but they experience a higher incidence of 
cognitive impairment than do younger persons, and that incidence 
increases with age.33 Clinicians tasked with evaluating capacity 
under PAD statutes must not, of course, substitute presumptions 
related to age or diagnosis of a neurocognitive condition for a 
criterion-relevant evaluation of capacity. Stereotypes of the 
functional abilities of older persons can and must be avoided. Yet 
assessment of treatment competence may be warranted in 
individual cases. 
A growing body of literature examines the treatment 
decisionmaking capacity of older persons.34 Patients diagnosed 
with neurocognitive disorders exhibit substantial individual 
variability in decisionmaking capacities. Even within the 
population of persons diagnosed as having Alzheimer’s Disease, 
“there is sufficient heterogeneity such that one cannot simply 
equate dementia with incapacity.”35 Research reveals that most 
persons with mild dementia meet legal standards of competence, 
particularly with additional supports to compensate for areas in 
which there may be deficits.  
Patients with certain terminal illnesses may be at higher risk 
than the general population of experiencing impairments in 
cognition.36 Some of these effects may be caused by the progress 
of the terminal disease itself, which may interfere with brain 
 
33 María M. Corrada, Ron Brookmeyer, Annlia Paganini-Hill, Daniel 
Berlau & Claudia H. Kawas, Dementia Incidence Continues to Increase 
with Age in the Oldest Old: The 90+ Study, 67 ANNALS NEUROLOGY 
114, 114 (2010). 
34 See, e.g., Scott Y.H. Kim, Jason H.T. Karlawish & Eric D. Caine, 
Current State of Research on Decision-Making Competence of 
Cognitively Impaired Elderly Persons, 10 AM. J. GERIATRIC 
PSYCHIATRY 151, 159–60 (2002); Jennifer Moye, Daniel C. Marson & 
Barry Edelstein, Assessment of Capacity in an Aging Society, 68 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 158, 158, 167 (2013). 
35 KIM, supra note 18, at 42. 
36 Moises Gaviria, Neil Pliskin & Adam Kney, Cognitive Impairment in 
Patients with Advanced Heart Failure and Its Implications on Decision-
Making Capacity, 17 CONGESTIVE HEART FAILURE 175, 175 (2011); 
Brooke Myers Sorger, Barry Rosenfeld, Hayley Pessin, Anne Kosinski 
Timm & James Cimino, Decision-Making Capacity in Elderly, 
Terminally Ill Patients with Cancer, 25 BEHAV. SCIS. & L. 393, 393 
(2007). 
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functioning or cause cognitive deterioration. Chemotherapy and 
radiation treatments may have a deleterious impact on cognitive 
functioning.37 Furthermore, recent studies reveal manifestations 
of cognitive impairment in hospice patients where clinical staff 
have not diagnosed or treated such conditions.38 Studies using the 
MacArthur measures of treatment competence demonstrate 
significant variability across hospice patient populations.39  
The relationships between cognitive impairment and 
treatment decisionmaking in persons at the end of life constitutes 
a new area of inquiry, and there remains much to learn. As in the 
case of mental disorders, a criterion-relevant, individualized 
assessment is essential to determine whether a neurocognitive 
limitation impairs treatment decisionmaking capacity. Even 
diagnosis of a neurocognitive condition does not necessarily 
render an individual unable to meet competence standards. It is 
also possible that supportive interventions, such as educational or 




37 J. Cara Pendergrass, Steven D. Targum & John E. Harrison, Cognitive 
Impairment Associated with Cancer: A Brief Review, 15 INNOVATIONS 
CLINICAL NEUROSCI. 36, 37 (2017); see also Ian F. Tannock, Tim A. 
Ahles, Patricia A. Ganz & Fritz S. Van Dam, Cognitive Impairment 
Associated with Chemotherapy for Cancer: Report of a Workshop, 22 J. 
CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 2233, 2233 (2004). 
38 Cynthia Z. Burton, Elizabeth W. Twamley, Lana C. Lee, Barton W. 
Palmer, Dilip V. Heste, Laura B. Dunn & Scott A. Irwin, Undetected 
Cognitive Impairment and Decision-Making Capacity in Patients 
Receiving Hospice Care, 20 AM. J. GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY 306, 306 
(2012); S.A. Irwin, C.H. Zurhellen, L.C. Diamond, L.B. Dunn, B.W. 
Palmer, D.V. Jeste & E.W. Twamley, Unrecognised Cognitive 
Impairment in Hospice Patients: A Pilot Study, 22 PALLIATIVE MED. 
842, 842 (2008). 
39 Elissa Kolva, Barry Rosenfeld, Robert Brescia & Christopher 
Comfort, Assessing Decision-Making Capacity at End of Life, 36 GEN. 
HOSP. PSYCHIATRY 392 (2014); Elissa Kolva, Barry Rosenfeld & 
Rebecca Saracino, Assessing the Decision Making Capacity of 
Terminally Ill Patients with Cancer, 26 AM. J. GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY 
523 (2018). 
40 See, e.g., Laura B. Dunn & Dilip V. Jeste, Enhancing Informed 
Consent for Research and Treatment, 24 
NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 595, 595 (2001). 
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Emerging Approaches to Evaluating Decisional  
Capacity in Patients Seeking PAD 
 
The University of California San Francisco Medical Center 
(“UCSFMC”) has developed an evidence-based assessment 
protocol to conduct mental health evaluations of persons 
requesting lethal prescriptions under California’s End of Life 
Option Act.41 UCSFMC requires all patients who seek PAD to be 
evaluated by the mental health team even though California law 
does not require this step for all patients. UCSFMC made this 
policy because of the centrality of this assessment to the statutory 
requirements. Five of the first six patients evaluated were 
determined to be capable under the statute; the sixth person was 
not found to be capable. The authors conclude: “Mild to moderate 
depressive disorder typically does not affect cognitive status so 
profoundly as to render a patient incapable of decisional capacity, 
even for [PAD]. Similarly, mild cognitive impairment . . . may be 




In the past fifty years, the law governing patients’ choices 
regarding their own medical care has shifted dramatically. Justice 
Cardozo’s famous words—“[e]very human being of adult years 
and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with 
his own body”43—emphasize that the right to make personal 
healthcare decisions depends on one’s capacity to make those 
choices. Without capacity, the value of autonomy is questionable, 
and the state’s interest in protecting those who cannot decide 
wisely for themselves outweighs a patient’s right to choose. 
Oregon’s experiment with PAD during the past quarter 
century, followed by legal reforms in nine other jurisdictions, has 
created a framework that promotes patient choice while screening 
out patients whose decisional impairments render them 
incompetent to choose. Findings from scientific studies suggest 
 
41 James A. Bourgeois et al, Physician-Assisted Death Psychiatric 
Assessment: A Standardized Protocol to Conform to the California End 
of Life Option Act, 39 PSYCHOSOMATICS 441, 441 (2018). 
42 Id. at 449. 
43 Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914). 
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that most persons seeking PAD will not demonstrate impaired 
judgment when evaluated with criterion-relevant capacity 
measures. However, further research is needed to better 
understand the relationships among decisional capacity and the 
range of factors that lead to cognitive challenges in persons who 
meet medical eligibility for PAD.  
While it is important not to presume incapacity based on the 
presence of a mental disorder, psychological symptoms, or 
depression, it is also important that the psychological suffering 
and mental health challenges of persons requesting PAD be 
identified when they exist. To the extent that these experiences 
and conditions impair capacity to decide regarding PAD, such 
information is relevant to that person’s eligibility under the 
statutes. Yet even for persons who meet statutory capacity 
requirements (whether or not they meet criteria for diagnosis of a 
mental disorder), the PAD request provides an opportunity for 
healthcare personnel to offer support and services that might ease 
such suffering.  
